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THE ABRAHAM L. POMERANTZ 
LECTURE 
 
Clearinghouse Governance 
MOVING BEYOND COSMETIC REFORM 
Kristin N. Johnson† 
INTRODUCTION 
The procedures that boards adopt in their decision-
making processes raise uniquely interesting questions. In one 
of the most thoughtful modern critiques of the functional role of 
corporate boards, theorists Colin Carter and Jay Lorsche argue 
that three critical issues influence the effectiveness of boards’ 
decision-making processes—time, knowledge, and information.1 
While each of the three elements merits careful consideration, 
conventional wisdom suggests that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for boards to make rational business decisions if 
they do not allocate sufficient time to decision-making 
processes.2 Recent popular accounts contradict the prevailing 
  
 † Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. B.S.F.S., Georgetown 
University; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. The author would like to thank 
Frank Partnoy, James Fanto, Kent Greenfield, the Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture 
Committee and Brooklyn Law School for the invitation to present these early 
reflections on pending federal rules. For excellent research assistance, I thank Mark 
Lauria, Christopher Gelpi, and Rick Halmo.  
 1 COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD 50-51, 
67-68 (2003). 
 2 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-75 (Del. 1985). But see 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. 
LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) (strongly criticizing the majority opinion as “one of the worst 
decisions in the history of corporate law”). The Delaware legislature adopted a 
statutory provision permitting companies incorporated in Delaware to amend their 
corporate charters to exculpate directors from claims alleging that they breached their 
fiduciary duties by failing to adopt a sufficiently rigorous investigative process or a 
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presumption that dedicating more time to the decision-making 
process improves the quality of the ultimate decision.3 In his 
New York Times best-selling account of the power of thinking, 
Malcolm Gladwell explains the countervailing view, arguing 
that decisions made in the blink of an eye may be as valuable 
as decisions characterized by months of rational analysis.4  
Notwithstanding the accolades bestowed on Gladwell’s 
contribution to the literature, not everyone finds his account 
persuasive. Dissecting Gladwell’s arguments that extol the virtues 
of “snap” decision making, Frank Partnoy’s recent article—“Don’t 
Blink: Snap Decisions and Securities Regulation”—offers an 
insightful analysis of the significance of timing and careful 
reflection in decision-making processes.5 Evaluating the 
convergence of increasingly complicated securities-trading 
technologies and complex financial products, Partnoy contends that 
boards may benefit from introducing a measured pace in their 
decision-making processes.6 Examining precipitating decisions at 
financial institutions in the period preceding the recent financial 
crisis and the events of the flash crash that threatened financial 
markets in May 2010, Partnoy concludes that boards should 
introduce procedural reforms that deter “snap” decision making 
and introduce safeguards that institute a delay or “pause” in 
financial institutions’ decision-making processes and financial 
intermediaries’ operational processes.7 
In addition to agreeing with Partnoy’s suggestion that 
decision makers may benefit from deliberation and delay in 
their decision-making processes, this article argues that 
further procedural safeguards are necessary to protect the 
stability of financial institutions and financial intermediaries. 
Evaluation of the board’s timeframe for making decisions forms 
part of a broader set of concerns regarding director 
accountability and institutional safeguards for risk-management 
oversight in the wake of the recent global financial crisis. In 
  
reasonable due diligence process. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Within 
two years of the Van Gorkom decision, forty-two states had adopted similar exculpation 
clauses. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the 
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (1990).  
 3 See, e.g., MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT 
THINKING 8 (2005). 
 4 See id. 
 5 See generally Frank Partnoy, Don’t Blink: Snap Decisions and Securities 
Regulation, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 151 (2011).  
 6 See generally id. 
 7 See generally id. 
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order to ensure that boards fulfill risk oversight obligations, 
proposed regulatory reforms should effectively address the other 
issues that influence the board’s ability to monitor, such as 
impartiality, expertise, and access to information.  
To illustrate the importance of these governance 
safeguards, this article explores federal regulatory reform 
proposals in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market. 
For more than two decades, commentators have encouraged 
regulators to adopt reforms that introduce a better regulatory 
framework in the OTC derivatives market.8 During the recent 
crisis, a number of financial institutions experienced 
devastating losses related to their OTC derivatives portfolios.9 
In response, the federal government extended several hundred 
billion dollars in federal aid to these financial institutions.10 
The federal bailout prompted demands for federal regulatory 
intervention. Congress, in turn, adopted the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank 
Act).11 The newly minted legislation imposes greater 
transparency in the OTC derivatives market by requiring that 
market participants settle and clear eligible OTC derivatives 
transactions through registered derivatives clearinghouses.12 
Notwithstanding the many benefits that clearinghouses 
engender, it is too early to celebrate the reforms’ success. In 
order for clearinghouses to have the desired risk-reducing 
effects, reforms must reach the more complicated issues that 
challenge risk governance. Regulation must introduce 
procedural measures that reduce the conflicts of interest or 
cognitive biases that lead boards to adopt weak risk-
management policies. Well-tailored governance safeguards are 
  
 8 See, e.g., Remarks of Brooksley Born, Chairperson Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n, Fordham University School of Law 1999 Derivatives & Risk 
Management Symposium (Jan. 28, 1999), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/ 
opaborn-42.htm; Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit 
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1023-32 (2007) (discussing the advocates who 
supported deregulation of off-exchange traded derivatives); andré douglas pond 
cummings, Still “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 
Other 1990s Deregulation Facilitated the Market Crash of 2002, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 467, 530 (2007) (same).  
 9 Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G., Still Troubled, Cuts Loss Sharply in First 
Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at B1.  
 10 David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow 
Tighter Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A1. 
 11 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  
 12 Id. But see Gretchen Morgenson, 3,000 Pages of Financial Reform, but Still 
Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at B1. 
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necessary to ensure accountability for risk-management 
oversight and to prevent clearing requirements from 
inadvertently creating a new source of systemic risk.  
This article examines proposed regulatory reforms in 
the OTC derivatives market, focusing on the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
requirement for derivatives counterparties to register and clear 
eligible transactions through clearinghouses. While the 
introduction of clearing requirements engenders important 
risk-mitigating benefits, commentators have voiced concerns 
regarding the incentives that certain larger, prominent 
clearinghouse members may have to adopt weak risk-
governance policies, or policies that limit access to 
clearinghouse membership. These concerns cast a shadow over 
the promise of reform. Regulators are moving quickly to 
address these concerns, but their proposed treatment is as 
disconcerting as the incomplete legislative approach. 
Regulators’ proposed reforms—customary board composition 
and structural solutions to the agency costs and conflicts of 
interest that arise in corporate governance—may be misguided 
in the context of clearinghouses. 
As Partnoy suggests, effective reforms must extend 
beyond conventional techniques and creatively address the 
timing element of decision making. We must consider 
mechanisms such as a required “pause” in the risk governance 
decision-making process. Because the debate regarding the final 
contours of regulatory guidelines continues, this article limits its 
purpose to outlining the origins of OTC derivatives, their role in 
the crisis, and the proposed legislative and regulatory efforts to 
address relevant concerns. Finally, this article underscores 
significant issues that regulators must consider as they engage 
in one of the most rigorous rule-making periods in the history of 
the federal regulation of financial markets.  
I. CRISIS AND REFORM IN THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET 
While many weaknesses in the regulation of financial 
markets contributed to the recent financial crisis, the absence of 
regulation in the OTC derivatives market has led to particularly 
significant concerns. Focusing on the role of credit default swaps 
(CDS) in the recent crisis, Section A argues that the lack of 
regulation in the OTC derivatives market created moral-hazard 
and systemic-risk concerns. Section B surveys the reforms 
Congress has adopted to address these concerns.  
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A. OTC Derivatives and the Financial Crisis  
Tasked with exploring “how the world’s strongest 
financial system came to the brink of collapse[,]”13 the Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission narrowed this broad inquiry to one 
central question: 
[H]ow did it come to pass that in 2008 our nation was forced to 
choose between two stark and painful alternatives—either risk the 
total collapse of our financial system and economy or inject trillions 
of taxpayer dollars into the financial system and an array of 
companies, as millions of Americans still lost their jobs, their 
savings, and their homes?14 
The Commission’s inquiry highlights the moral-hazard 
and systemic-risk concerns that plagued financial markets for 
the last several years. The origin or genesis of the crisis, 
however, dates back at least two decades. In the twenty-year 
period prior to the recent financial crisis, financial institutions 
acquired unprecedented debt portfolios; during this period, the 
volume of debt products that financial institutions held 
increased from $3 trillion to $36 trillion.15 Evidence suggests 
that, in pursuit of profits, financial institutions implemented 
highly leveraged business and investment strategies, meaning 
their exposure to debt obligations far exceeded the capital or 
collateral reserves available to satisfy those debt obligations.16  
During the same period, consolidation in the financial 
services industry led to a high concentration of credit-related 
risks.17 The small group of financial institutions participating 
in the origination and trading of higher-risk credit and debt 
investment products began to increase their roles as market 
makers and counterparties in the OTC derivatives market.18 
  
 13 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xvi (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]. 
 14 Id.  
 15 Id. at xvii. 
 16 See Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate 
Governance 14, 22, 32 (San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-
052, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1794190##.  
 17 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT 
ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: FIRST QUARTER 2010, at 1 (2010) 
(“Derivatives activity in the U.S. banking system continues to be dominated by a small 
group of large financial institutions.”).  
 18 As of March 2008, the top twenty-five commercial and investment banks in the 
United States held more than $13 trillion in credit default swaps, with J.P. Morgan Chase, 
Citibank, Bank of America, and Wachovia among the most active traders in credit default 
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Contemporaneously, the size of the OTC derivatives market 
increased markedly—growing from a notional amount of $95.2 
trillion in 2000 to approximately $673 trillion in 2007.19 
The absence of regulation fostered obscurity in the OTC 
derivatives market. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
legislators expressly rejected calls for regulatory oversight in 
the OTC derivatives market and adopted legislation exempting 
OTC derivatives from the regulatory purview of the Securities 
Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission.20 Critics argued that regulation would have been 
redundant because self-regulation and a spirit of “self-
preservation . . . would shield [financial institutions] from fatal 
risk-taking.”21 Moreover, critics of regulation concluded that 
regulation would “stifle innovation.”22  
CDSs reallocate risk by spreading risk exposure across 
a group of creditors, thereby reducing the risk exposure that 
each individual creditor faces.23 CDS agreements allow 
protection buyers to shift some percentage of the risk of an 
issuer’s default on a debt obligation identified in the CDS 
agreement (covered debt obligation) to its counterparty in the 
  
swaps. Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME BUSINESS (Mar. 17, 
2008), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html. 
 19 FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 48. 
 20 See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default 
Swaps Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 175, 221-28 (2011) (explaining congressional 
legislative efforts to ensure that federal regulatory agencies lacked authority to 
exercise jurisdiction over OTC derivatives); FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 48-50 
(discussing the effect of the adoption of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000); see also id. at xviii (examining the absence of regulation and weak self-
regulatory measures, the FCIC explained that “[m]ore than 30 years of deregulation 
and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions, championed by former Federal 
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and others, supported by successive 
administrations and Congresses, and actively pushed by the powerful financial 
industry at every turn, had stripped away key safeguards”). 
 21 FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xviii; see also Edmund L. Andrews, 
Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1; 
Jacob M. Schlesinger, What’s Wrong? The Deregulators: Did Washington Help Set Stage 
for Current Business Turmoil?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at A1 (explaining how CFTC 
Chair Brooksley Born was strongly criticized for attempting to investigate the need for 
regulation in the OTC derivatives market). 
 22 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xviii; see also Schlesinger, supra note 
21, at B1 (“[Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin] took seriously Wall Street’s complaints 
that even the threat of regulation could void pending transactions. Mr. Greenspan 
believed that innovative derivatives were making the economy more efficient by 
providing companies with a hedge against financial fluctuations.”).  
 23 See Partnoy & Skeel, Jr., supra note 8, at 1023-27 (discussing the benefits 
of CDSs). 
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agreement—the protection seller.24 Early proponents of CDSs 
praised the instruments for their risk-mitigating benefits.25 
Arguably, this reallocation of risk militates against systemic 
risk—the threat that one large debt issuer’s default or several 
debtors’ defaults may cripple a systemically significant 
financial institution or trigger a domino effect of losses, leading 
to broader market disruption or multiple insolvencies.26  
While many financial institutions faltered during the 
crisis, American International Group, Inc.’s (AIG) notorious 
and unparalleled liquidity and solvency crisis prompted the 
government to intervene and extend unprecedented federal 
financial aid to the international insurance firm.27 AIG’s 
exposure to CDSs illustrates the concerns arising from 
financial institutions’ increasing involvement in the OTC 
derivatives market.28 In the early 2000s, AIG’s Financial 
  
 24 See, e.g., id. at 1023-24; Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks 
Before the Futures Indus. Ass’n, Boca Raton, Fla. (Mar. 19, 1999) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990319.htm) (stating that “[b]y 
far the most significant event in finance during the past decade has been the 
extraordinary development and expansion of financial derivatives”).  
 25 Alan Greenspan was one of the most outspoken senior regulators to endorse 
the risk-spreading benefits of credit derivatives. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. 
Reserve, Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago’s Forty-First Annual Conference on Bank Structure: Risk Transfer and Financial 
Stability (May 5, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/ 
Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm) (“Two years ago at this conference I argued that 
the growing array of derivatives and the related application of more-sophisticated [sic] 
methods for measuring and managing risks had been key factors underlying the 
remarkable resilience of the banking system, which had recently shrugged off severe 
shocks to the economy and the financial system.”). 
 26 See Partnoy & Skeel, Jr., supra note 8, at 1023-32 (discussing the 
advocates who supported deregulation of off-exchange traded derivatives). 
 27  For a description of the details of the AIG bailout, see Press Release, Fed. 
Reserve Bd. (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/other/20080916a.htm (announcing bailout and explaining that failure of AIG 
would damage markets). 
 28 Specifically, AIG’s difficulties stemmed from its participation in the credit 
derivatives market. Credit derivatives are one class of OTC derivatives. The class of 
credit derivatives comprises two types of financial products, credit default swaps and 
collateralized debt obligations. Credit default swap agreements are bilateral contracts 
that allow parties to transfer risk, allowing a creditor to shift to a CDS counterparty 
some or all of the risk exposure related to a debt obligation (covered debt obligation) 
referenced in the contractual agreement. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 192-96. The 
covered debt issuer’s default triggers the CDS counterparty’s obligations (protection 
seller) to provide insurance-like protection on the covered debt obligation. The notional 
amount of an OTC derivatives transaction describes the par amount or face value of 
the bonds or debt instruments that comprise the covered debt obligations named in the 
agreement. Id. at 215 n.246 (citation omitted). The party who buys protection in a 
credit default swap agreement (protection buyer) faces two types of credit or default 
risks. The protection buyer faces the risk that the issuer of the covered debt obligation 
will default. Id. at 194. If the debt issuer defaults, the protection buyer looks to the 
protection seller to satisfy its obligations under the terms and mitigate losses related to 
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Products division (AIGFP) aggressively developed its position 
in the credit derivatives market.29 Historical analysis of default 
rates on certain debt securities, such as residential mortgages, 
suggested a low probability of any significant losses on 
collateralized debt obligations composed of these debt 
instruments.30 As a result, protection sellers presumed that 
CDS agreements offering protection against a decline in the 
value of collateralized debt obligations (CDO)—specifically 
CDOs that bundled residential mortgages—presented little 
risk exposure.31  
In the company’s 2002 annual report, AIG did disclose 
AIGFP’s increasing participation in the credit derivatives 
business.32 From 2003 to 2006, AIG’s annual reports discussed 
OTC derivatives and included innocuous statements regarding 
participation in the credit derivatives market.33 However, after 
  
the covered debt obligation. Id. Consequently, the protection buyer faces another level 
of credit risk, the threat that the protection seller will default on the terms of the CDS 
agreement. Id. at 206. This latter risk is referred to as counterparty risk. Id. 
 29  Gretchen Morgenson, A.I.G., Where Taxpayers’ Dollars Go to Die, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at BU1. 
 30  Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Financial Markets and Networks—Implications 
for Financial Market Regulation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 613, 618-20 (2009). 
 31  See Johnson, supra note 20, at 215 n.248. 
 32  See, e.g., Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 97-99 (Mar. 31, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012303003570/ 
y65998e10vk.txt (discussing AIG’s financial services) (“AIGFP enters into credit derivative 
transactions in the ordinary course of its business. The overwhelming majority of AIGFP’s 
credit derivatives require AIGFP to provide credit protection on a designated portfolio of 
loans or debt securities.”). Credit derivatives include CDS and collateralized debt 
obligations. For a description of collateralized debt obligations or securitization, see Arthur 
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the 
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 984-86 (2009) (“The 
securitization process begins when a bank (referred to as the ‘sponsor’) transfers loans that 
it has originated, or purchased from others, to a special-purpose entity (SPE). The SPE is 
structured so that it will be shielded from potential claims arising out of the sponsor’s 
bankruptcy. The SPE creates a loan pool (sometimes by combining the sponsor’s loans with 
loans sold by other lenders), and the SPE sells that pool to a second SPE, typically organized 
as a trust. The role of the second SPE is to manage the loan pool and to issue ABS that 
confer rights to receive cash flows from the pooled loans. The second SPE (the ‘SPE issuer’) 
hires an investment bank (frequently an affiliate of the sponsor) to underwrite the sale of 
ABS to investors. After the underwriting has been completed, the proceeds paid by investors 
for the ABS are transferred to the sponsor in payment for the loans. Also, in many cases, the 
SPE issuer hires the sponsor to act as servicing agent for the securitized loans.”). 
 33  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 106 (Mar. 15, 2004), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012304003302/y92059e10vk.htm; Am. 
Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 180 (May 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012305006884/y03319e10vk.htm; Am. Int’l 
Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 52 (Mar. 16, 2006), available at 
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/76/76115/10K_06.pdf; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 63 (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/5272/000095012307003026/y27490e10vk.htm. 
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the company began to suffer losses on its credit derivatives 
portfolio in 2007,34 the tenor of the disclosure shifted 
dramatically. The 2007 annual report disclosures revealed 
AIG’s exposure to a net notional amount of protection covering 
over $500 billion of debt products35:  
 
Net Notional Amount (in billions) 
Corporate loans  $230
Prime residential mortgages $149
Corporate debt/Collateralized loan 
obligations  
$70
Multi-sector collateralized debt 
obligations 
$78
Total $527
 
Market participants had become overconfident, treating 
the risk-mitigating benefits of CDSs as guarantees that 
insured against losses related to an issuer’s default on a 
covered debt obligation.36 As a result, market participants 
underestimated the risk of counterparty default; they failed to 
appreciate the danger that an issuer might default on its 
obligations related to a covered debt and, at the same time, 
that a protection seller might default on its obligations under 
the CDS agreement.37 When default rates on subprime 
mortgages began to accelerate in 2007, the absence of minimal, 
conventional risk-monitoring and uniform collateral reserve 
requirements in the OTC derivatives market triggered a 
cascade of severe losses.38 
Because market participants mistakenly perceived 
CDSs as guarantees that eliminated default risk, they reduced 
  
 34  Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 81 (Feb. 28, 2008) 
[hereinafter AIG 2007 Annual Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/5272/000095012308002280/y44393e10vk.htm. 
 35  Id. at 122. 
 36 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 20, at 215-16. 
 37 Id.; Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to 
Pass Real-World Test, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at A1; Serena Ng, AIG, Goldman 
Unwind Soured Trades—Move on Mortgage Deals Leaves Insurer with Loss of About $2 
Billion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2010, at C1.  
 38 FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xxiv.  
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demands for traditional risk-reducing safeguards, such as 
reserving sufficient collateral to offset losses.39 Even when CDS 
agreements did include collateral requirements, their terms 
were often significantly relaxed.40 By the time CDS 
counterparties began to question protection sellers’ ability to 
satisfy CDS obligations in 2007, the market was already 
quickly unraveling.41  
What motivated AIG executives to aggressively increase 
the company’s credit derivative portfolio in the years prior to the 
financial crisis? Some theorists posit that executives at AIG and 
other financial institutions received lucrative compensation based 
on the fees that AIG earned on CDSs during the years prior to the 
wave of subprime mortgage defaults that began in 2007.42 
As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted, 
“Compensation systems—designed in an environment of cheap 
money, intense competition, and light regulation—too often 
rewarded the quick deal, the short-term gain—without proper 
consideration of long-term consequences.”43 According to the 
conclusions in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s report,  
dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at 
many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of 
this crisis . . . . Too many of these institutions acted recklessly, taking 
on too much risk, with too little capital, and with too much dependence 
on short-term funding . . . . [L]arge investment banks and bank 
  
 39 See Heather Landy, Unregulated Market Faces Test as Corporate Defaults 
Pile Up, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2008, at A9. 
 40 Mollenkamp, supra note 37, at A1; Ng, supra note 37, at C1. 
 41 Houman B. Shadab, Credit Risk Transfer Governance: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Savvy, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 69-71), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919922. 
 42 Citigroup’s experience underwriting CDOs similarly suggests that 
compensation arrangements rewarded executives for risk taking without imposing 
parallel consequences if risky decisions led to significant losses. See Kristin N. Johnson, 
Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight 
Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 62-64 (2011). The structure of compensation 
policies created incentives for executives and directors to take risk. Id. at 57. Citigroup 
tripled its CDO offerings, increasing the total of CDO securities issued from $6.28 billion 
in 2003 to $20 billion in 2005. See, e.g., Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, The Reckoning: 
Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html. Citigroup 
received approximately $500 million in fees from its CDO offerings in 2005. Id. When 
residential mortgage default rates and foreclosures began to rise in 2007 and 2008, the 
decline in the value of Citigroup’s CDO portfolio and inventory of traditional and subprime 
mortgage-related assets forced Citigroup to substantially write down its CDO inventory. See 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Crisis: 
Reflections on In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE 
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 113, 18 (2010).  
 43 FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xix.  
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holding companies . . . focused their activities increasingly on risky 
trading activities that produced hefty profits. They took on enormous 
exposures in acquiring and supporting subprime lenders and creating, 
packaging, repackaging, and selling trillions of dollars in mortgage-
related securities, including synthetic financial products.
44  
In response to the announcement that “the first quarter 
of 2008 ‘brought [AIG]’s CDS portfolio to a cumulative $20.6 
billion loss between October 2007 and May 2008,’” shareholders 
filed a derivative action alleging that directors breached their 
fiduciary duties by failing to effectively monitor the company’s 
exposure to risk in the credit derivatives market.45 Some have 
argued that the novel claims seeking to hold directors liable for 
failing to monitor risk offer a tool for balancing directors’ 
accountability for risk oversight with their authority to make 
risk-management decisions for the company.46 However, recent 
state court decisions indicate that plaintiffs face a high bar 
when pleading that directors breached their fiduciary 
obligations by failing to monitor risk exposure related to 
sophisticated financial products.47 
As a result of limitations that exist under state fiduciary 
accountability standards, recently adopted federal regulations 
introduce additional reforms.48 The Dodd-Frank Act introduces 
regulatory reforms intended to respond to concerns related to 
financial institutions’ incentive-based compensation structures, 
conflicts of interest related to compensation, and concerns 
regarding the operational weaknesses in the OTC derivatives 
market.49 In a separate project I address the former concerns.50 
This article outlines reform efforts addressing the latter concerns.  
The recently adopted federal statute introduces an 
institutional mechanism—a requirement that market 
participants clear and settle eligible OTC derivatives contracts 
through federally authorized clearinghouses. The clearing 
requirement delegates primary risk-governing authority to an 
intermediary—OTC derivatives clearinghouses. While 
  
 44 Id. at xviii-xix. 
 45 See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Derivative Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 419, 426, 
433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted). 
 46 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk 
Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 967-68 (2009).  
 47 See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Derivative Litig., 415 F. App’x 285 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 48 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 49 See Johnson, supra note 20, at 240-42. 
 50 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 42, at 56-57. 
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imposing clearing requirements on eligible OTC derivatives 
transactions creates a more transparent and more efficient 
market, delegating primary regulatory oversight to 
clearinghouses also raises certain risk-governance concerns. 
B. The Road to Reform: Clearinghouses 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act requires OTC 
derivatives market participants to register OTC transactions 
with an information repository and to clear these transactions 
through registered derivatives clearing organizations (DCO) or 
clearinghouses.51 Prior to the imposition of registration and 
clearing requirements, parties trading in the OTC derivatives 
market entered into private, bilateral contracts.52 The Dodd-
Frank Act assigns regulatory oversight of securities-related 
OTC derivatives and commodities-related OTC derivatives to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 
respectively.53 Clearinghouses and exchanges are commonly 
used to register and clear other financial products.54 Each 
registered clearinghouse will offer a platform for originating 
and trading OTC derivatives that comply with the federal 
agencies’ final rules.55 
  
 51 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. at 1675-82, 1762-84. 
 52 See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, Jr., supra note 8, at 1021-22. 
 53 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. at 1675-82, 1762-84. 
 54 For historical reflections on the use of financial intermediaries for clearing and 
settlement services, see generally Alexander D. Noyes, Stock Exchange Clearing Houses, 8 
POL. SCI. Q. 252, 256 (1893); see also Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets 
Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-
the-Counter Innovations, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 596, 598-604 (1999). 
 55 Clearinghouses began clearing OTC derivatives well before the financial 
crisis. During the crisis when it became apparent that regulation was imminent, 
financial intermediaries petitioned regulatory agencies for formal authorization and 
acknowledgement of their authority to clear and settle OTC derivatives transactions. 
The CFTC has cleared eight companies as clearinghouses with one company’s 
registration pending. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC 
Grants CME Clearing Europe Limited Registration as a Derivatives Clearing 
Organization (Sept. 6, 2011); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
CFTC Grants ICE Clear Europe Limited Registration as a Derivatives Clearing 
Organization (Jan. 25, 2010); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
CFTC Grants New York Portfolio Clearing, LLC Registration as a Derivatives Clearing 
Organization (Feb. 1, 2011); In re London Clearing House, Order of Registration (2001); 
In re Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Inc., Order of Transfer of Derivatives Clearing 
Organization Registration (2010); In re Natural Gas Exchange, Inc., Order of 
Registration (2008); In re North American Derivatives Exchange, Amended Order of 
Registration (2010); In re The Options Clearing Corporation, Order of Registration 
(2001); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Requests Public 
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The Dodd-Frank Act reflects Congress and regulators’ 
perception that centralized clearing will “foster greater 
efficiencies . . . and promote transparency” in the OTC 
derivatives markets.56 A clearinghouse functions as a central 
counterparty, agreeing to act as an intermediary for all 
transactions that are cleared and settled on its platform.57 As a 
central counterparty, the clearinghouse agrees to act as a buyer 
in each transaction in which a clearinghouse member seeks to 
enter into a contract as a seller.58 When a clearinghouse 
member seeks to enter into a transaction as a seller, the 
clearinghouse agrees to act as a buyer.59 By standing in the 
middle, the clearinghouse becomes the counterparty for each 
transaction executed on its platform.60 
Clearinghouses offer market participants many 
benefits. Similar to the benefits of an exchange, the 
introduction of a clearinghouse lowers spreads and transaction 
costs for users and enhances price discovery.61 Clearinghouses 
facilitate loss mutualization,62 credit-risk homogenization,63 and 
multilateral netting,64 improving market efficiency.65  
Clearinghouses reduce the risk of counterparty default. 
By acting as an intermediary in each agreement that is 
  
Comment on an Application by Eurex Clearing AG for Registration as a Derivatives 
Clearing Organization (Sept. 29, 2011).  
 56 Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National 
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 
Fed. Reg. 65,885 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
 57 Id. 
 58 See Robert R. Bliss & Chryssa Papathanassiou, Derivatives Clearing, 
Central Counterparties and Novation: The Economic Implications 19-24 (Mar. 8, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ecb.int/events/pdf/conferences/ccp/ 
BlissPapathanassiou_final.pdf. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 As described above, the organizational documents of clearinghouses 
provide for the clearinghouse to maintain reserves to provide sufficient assets to cover 
any clearinghouse member’s default on contractual obligations. In addition, the 
clearinghouse also has authority to seek additional capital contributions if the losses 
related to a member’s default exceed reserves. See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, The Economics 
of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing 
of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty 26 (Jan. 8, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the University of Houston Department of Finance), available 
at http://www.cba.uh.edu/spirrong/clearing_organization.pdf. 
 63 Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic 
Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (2011). 
 64 See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 62, at 26. 
 65 Id. 
694 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
registered, cleared, and settled on its platform, the 
clearinghouse mitigates members’ exposure to the risk of 
another member’s default.66 Because the clearinghouse is the 
central counterparty to each transaction, members no longer 
face the risk that counterparties will default on their 
contractual obligations.67 In addition to its services as a 
matchmaker—pairing trade requests from members—the 
clearinghouse also agrees to act as a guarantor for transactions 
executed on the clearinghouse platform.68 Consequently, the 
clearinghouse must adopt effective risk-management policies 
that vigilantly monitor members’ abilities to satisfy obligations 
related to transactions executed on its platform.  
Traditionally, clearinghouses employ several strategic 
risk-management mechanisms to ensure that members satisfy 
their contractual obligations.69 Clearinghouses establish 
collateral and margin requirements that provide a means for 
the clearinghouse to mitigate a member’s default.70 
Clearinghouses periodically evaluate members’ credit quality 
and require members to contribute to a reserve fund or, in the 
event of a liquidity crisis, to contribute capital to preserve the 
solvency and integrity of the clearinghouse. As a result, the 
clearinghouse insulates each member from the risk that 
another member will default on obligations cleared and settled 
on the clearinghouse platform.71  
  
 66 Id. at 17, 22-25; see, e.g., id. at 3-5 (arguing that the clearinghouse will only 
offer these benefits in markets that reflect conditions of complete information, but noting 
that market conditions, asymmetries of information, incentives to shift costs and 
distributive effects on pricing of default risk may increase systemic risk); see also Robert 
R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and Settlement: A Comparison of 
Central Counterparties and Alternative Structures, 30 ECON. PERSP. 22, 24-26 (2006). 
 67 See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 66, at 25 (“Credit risk, on the other 
hand, is centralized in the CCP itself”). Generally, clearinghouses only enter into 
matching transactions, meaning a clearinghouse will enter into an agreement with a 
member (Member A) acting as a protection seller only if the clearinghouse has already 
identified another member (Member B) who agrees to enter into a contemporaneous 
arrangement whereby the clearinghouse assigns its rights and obligations as a 
protection seller in the agreement with Member A to Member B. By matching 
transactions and substituting members into its positions in agreements clearing and 
settling on its platform, the clearinghouse minimizes its exposure to counterparty 
default risk. Id. at 24 (“A [clearinghouse] can be defined as ‘[a]n entity that interposes 
itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, 
becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.’” (citation omitted)). 
 68 See id. at 24-25. 
 69 See id. at 25. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See Squam Lake Working Grp. on Fin. Regulation, Credit Default Swaps, 
Clearinghouses, and Exchanges 4 (Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper, 2000), 
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On the one hand, clearinghouses will likely have the 
effect of reducing systemic risk by interposing a central 
counterparty in each derivatives transaction. The introduction 
of clearinghouses alleviates concerns that one of the two 
counterparties to a derivatives agreement will default on its 
obligations.72 On the other hand, clearinghouses concentrate 
default risk. If the clearinghouse inaccurately assesses the 
creditworthiness of a member and the member defaults on its 
obligations, the clearinghouse may incur a loss.73 Significant 
errors in setting margin and collateral obligations may 
ultimately cause the clearinghouse to become insolvent.74 
Having the clearinghouse act as the backstop for all 
agreements cleared on its platform creates concerns that a 
systemically significant financial institution may default, 
causing extensive losses that bankrupt the clearinghouse.75 The 
potential bankruptcy of a clearinghouse creates systemic risk 
concerns. After agreements migrate from the private, bilateral 
market to clearinghouses, the threat of systemic risk shifts 
from a concern that a systemically significant financial 
institution (or series of systemically significant financial 
institutions) might fail, to the threat that the clearinghouse 
may face a liquidity crisis. In the event of a clearinghouse 
failure, the government might be compelled to extend funds to 
bail-out the clearinghouse to prevent a wave of losses across 
the industry. Thus, rigorous risk-management policies serve a 
critical role in the clearinghouse’s success and, by extension, 
the successful mitigation of systemic risk.76  
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF REFORM: CLEARINGHOUSES ARE 
NOT A PANACEA  
While the clearing requirements imposed by the Dodd-
Frank Act offer a safeguard that enhances risk oversight in the 
operational framework of the OTC derivatives market, there 
are concerns that the legislation offers too little guidance 
regarding clearing organizations’ internal risk governance 
policies. As a consequence of the mandatory clearing 
  
available at http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/credit-default-swaps-clearinghouses-
exchanges/p19756. 
 72 See generally Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 66. 
 73 See id. at 25.  
 74 See id. 
 75 See id.  
 76 See generally id. 
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requirement, all eligible transactions must be executed on the 
platform of one of the few authorized clearinghouses. Currently 
only a handful of clearing businesses have received 
authorization to clear and settle OTC derivatives transactions. 
Ironically, the transition from private, bilateral agreements to 
an organized, more transparent market may have the effect of 
concentrating risk in OTC derivatives markets. Thus, the 
limited competition in the clearing industry may concentrate 
risk and perpetuate systemic risk concerns.  
In addition to concerns about effective risk management in 
the operational framework of the OTC derivatives market, there 
are fundamental concerns regarding the concentration of decision-
making authority within the internal governance structure of 
authorized clearinghouses. A small number of systemically 
significant financial institutions or large dealers exercise voting 
control in the few authorized clearinghouses. Large dealers have 
voting control and the authority to elect directors who decide the 
clearinghouses’ risk-management policies. When the commercial 
interests of these large dealers diverge from the clearinghouse’s 
commercial interests or the normative legislative goals of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, a new set of systemic risk concerns emerges. In 
effect, this arrangement places decision-making authority 
regarding the internal risk-management policies of OTC 
derivatives clearinghouses in the hands of institutions whose 
internal risk oversight failures related to OTC derivatives 
products triggered a global economic recession. 
A. Clearinghouse Governance 
A clearinghouse may be a privately owned business that 
is closely held by members who exercise complete voting 
control over the governance and affairs of the business. 
Alternatively, a clearinghouse may be a company (or the 
subsidiary of a company) whose shares are publicly traded on a 
national securities exchange.77 In either case, internal policies 
  
 77 See CME Grp., 2010 Annual Report 5 (2010) (CME Group is the parent 
company of CME Clearing Europe Ltd.); Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT 4 (2010) (ICE is the parent company of ICE Clear Europe Ltd. ICE’s customers 
include “corporations, manufacturers, utilities, commodity producers and refiners, 
professional traders, financial institutions, institutional and individual investors and 
governmental bodies.”); Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. PORTFOLIO CLEARING, 
http://www.nypclear.com/faqs (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (“How is the company structured? 
NYPC is a 50-50 joint venture between the DTCC and NYSE Euronext.”); LCH.CLEARNET, 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (LCH Clearnet is an independent 
company which “is owned 83% by its clients and 17% by [the] exchanges.”); Minneapolis 
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may limit nonmembers’ access to the clearinghouse’s services.78 
Generally, nonmember firms may only clear or settle 
transactions through a clearinghouse if a member agrees to 
serve as an intermediary and executes the transaction on 
behalf of the nonmember.79 What motivates such preferential 
treatment for members?  
Members agree to be subject to periodic credit 
evaluations, to make capital contributions, and to maintain 
collateral and margin accounts to satisfy trading obligations.80 
Members also agree to contribute to a reserve or guarantee fund 
designed to ensure that the clearinghouse remains solvent if a 
member defaults on a large contract obligation and its margin 
account is insufficient to cover the loss, or if several members 
default on multiple contract obligations and their margin 
accounts contain less collateral than the amount of their losses.81  
Investing in a clearinghouse affords members the 
authority to develop, implement, and enforce the governance 
measures of the clearinghouse. This authority permits 
members to determine the criteria for membership; it also 
allows members to establish collateral and margin policies (and 
policies regarding the contributions for reserves or a guarantee 
fund), clearing and settlement policies, and risk-management 
policies.82 However, clearinghouse members’ interests may be 
  
Grain Exchange, Inc., MGEX BROCHURE (2011), available at www.mgex.com/ 
documants/MGEXFOLDER_versZE.pdf (MGEX is made up of 399 members in addition to 
the board of directors. “Memberships are bought and sold between individuals and firms 
with supply and demand affecting prices.”); Frequently Asked Questions, NATURAL GAS 
EXCHANGE, INC., http://www.ngx.com/trading_faq.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (“Who 
owns NGX?” NGX is wholly owned by TSX Group); see also TMX Grp., First Quarter 2011 
Report to Shareholders 60 (2011) (description of the earnings per share)); About Us: IG 
Group, NORTH AMERICAN DERIVATIVES EXCHANGE, INC., http://www.nadex.com/ 
trade/ig-group.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (Nadex is fully backed by IG Group which is 
a publicly traded company on the London Stock Exchange.); Options Clearing Corporation, 
2010 Annual Report 12 (2010) (OCC’s membership consists of “130 of the largest U.S. 
broker-dealers, U.S. future commission merchants, and non-U.S. securities firms. . . . The 
stockholder exchanges share equal ownership of OCC.”); Company Profile, EUREX CLEARING 
AG, http://www.eurexclearing.com/about/company_profile_en.html (last visited Oct. 14, 
2011) (Eurex is a wholly owned subsidiary of Eurex Frankfurt AG and a public company.)  
 78 See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND COUNTERPARTY 
RISK 52 (2009), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/creditdefaultswapsand 
counterpartyrisk2009en.pdf. 
 79 Id. 
 80 DARRELL DUFFIE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 424, 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 21 (2010), 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr424.pdf (discussing 
resort to capital base).  
 81 Id.; see also Kress, supra note 63, at 63. 
 82 Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 66, at 25 (discussing counterparty credit 
risk management techniques). 
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strikingly diverse and certain members’ interests may diverge 
from the collective profit-maximizing, risk management, or 
long-term stability-oriented interests of the broader group of 
clearinghouse members. Members’ authority to determine 
clearinghouse governance policies engenders a distinct set of 
risk-management concerns.  
Large dealers may exert influence through the election 
of clearinghouse board members and the appointment of board 
members to particular board committees. Board members and 
committees controlled by larger dealers will establish policies 
that affect the following: clearinghouses’ collateral 
requirements, capital reserve requirements for margin 
accounts, or credit-quality standards used to assess eligibility 
for membership and clearing eligibility standards. 
Large dealers have incentives to limit smaller dealers’ 
access to clearinghouse membership. When large dealers act as 
brokers for the smaller nonmember dealers, the larger dealers 
earn revenues for executing transactions for dealers who are 
nonmembers and ineligible for membership. If eligibility 
standards preclude smaller dealers from gaining the full benefits 
of membership, then small dealers who desire to execute 
transactions must seek the assistance of the larger dealers who 
are members. Thus, large dealers have commercial incentives to 
ensure that smaller dealers remain ineligible for membership. 
Prior to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, large dealers 
earned significant profits from the fees that they received for 
executing transactions on behalf of smaller dealers.83  
Restricting clearinghouse membership based on the size 
of a transaction or the volume of deals that a dealer executes 
ensures that smaller dealers must arrange for larger dealers to 
serve as brokers.84 This dynamic reflects one conflict of interest 
that large dealers face. This conflict portends that rent-seeking 
  
 83 See Christine Harper et al., Wall Street Stealth Lobby Defends $35 Billion 
Derivatives Haul, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2009), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agFM_w6e2i00; see also Ownership Limitations and 
Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based 
Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges with Respect to 
Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,8845 (proposed 
Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
 84 See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-
Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and 
National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under 
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,886 (“Participants may seek to limit the 
number of other direct participants in a security-based swap clearing agency in order 
to limit competition and increase their ability to maintain higher profit margins.”).  
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behavior may undermine the Dodd-Frank Act’s efforts to 
enhance transparency and mitigate systemic risk. 
Similar to concerns regarding large dealers’ incentives 
to place anticompetitive limits on small dealers’ access to 
clearinghouse membership, commentators argue that large 
dealers with rent-seeking motives may urge boards to adopt 
policies that restrict the classes or volume of transactions that 
may be executed on clearinghouse platforms.85 Members who 
exercise voting control over clearinghouses have incentives to 
minimize the products that the clearinghouse deems eligible for 
clearing.86 The Dodd-Frank Act exempts contracts that are not 
eligible for clearing from mandatory registration and clearing 
requirements.87 When clearinghouses adopt restrictive clearing 
criteria, fewer products are eligible to be cleared. If 
clearinghouse policies permit discriminatory eligibility criteria, 
then a large volume of transactions will continue to occur in a 
private, bilateral market. As a result, a significant volume of 
transactions will remain in the shadows of the market. 
Consequently, the effectiveness of mandating clearing through 
clearinghouses will be undermined and the opacity in the 
secondary market will weaken industry-wide systemic risk-
management efforts.  
Large dealers who control clearinghouse governance have 
incentives to adopt very narrow clearing eligibility criteria. By 
limiting the types of transactions that are eligible for clearing 
through the clearinghouse, large dealers may artificially restrict 
the volume of transactions that will be subject to the clearing 
requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act.88 Clearinghouses, 
  
 85 For a discussion regarding larger dealers’ commercial interests that may 
be divergent from the interests of clearinghouse shareholders (owners) or smaller 
dealers’ interests in minimizing trading costs, see, for example, DUFFIE ET AL., supra 
note 80, at 10 (“[D]ealers have an incentive to maintain the wider bid-ask spreads that 
they can obtain in the OTC market . . . . Thus, from the viewpoint of their profits, 
dealers may prefer to reduce the migration of derivatives trading from the OTC market 
to central exchanges.”).  
 86 See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-
Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and 
National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under 
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,887. 
 87 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 763(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1762 (2010). 
 88 SEC/CFTC Joint Roundtable, CFTC-SEC Staff Roundtable on Clearing of 
Credit Default Swaps 48-49 (Oct. 22, 2010) (statement of Kristin Johnson) [hereinafter 
Johnson, Comments] (a roundtable to assist the agencies in the rulemaking process to 
implement the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). See 
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing 
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controlled by private members with diverse commercial 
objectives, will determine clearing eligibility policies.89 All the 
transactions that a clearinghouse refuses to clear and settle will 
be executed in the private market where a large dealer will 
likely earn fees for facilitating these transactions.  
Large members’ control over clearinghouse board 
decision-making processes creates additional risk management 
concerns. Many of the large dealers who will exercise control 
over clearinghouse voting interests are financial institutions 
subject to regulatory capital requirements.90 These members 
have significant incentives to encourage the adoption of policies 
that reduce the amount of collateral that must be reserved in 
their clearinghouse margin accounts or to overvalue the 
collateral maintained in margin accounts.91 If the margin and 
collateral policies are ineffective, there will be insufficient funds 
to cover the losses if a member defaults. 
Commentators have argued that the concerns described 
above threaten to undermine the clearing mandate.92 Congress 
adopted the Dodd-Frank Act to enhance transparency in the 
OTC derivatives market.93 The provisions of Title VII of the 
  
Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges 
with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,890. 
 89 Section 763(a) adds new Section 3C(d)(3)(A) to the Exchange Act, which 
prohibits the Commission from requiring any clearing agency to accept a security-
based swap for central clearing. See Dodd-Frank Act § 763(a), 124 Stat. at 1764. 
 90 See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-
Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and 
National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under 
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,890.  
 91 See id. at 65,887. 
 92 This article identifies several critical risk management concerns that arise from 
members’ anticompetitive incentives or conflicts of interest. Several ancillary issues generate 
similar concerns. For a more detailed treatment of the risk management concerns arising from 
clearinghouse governance policies, see Sean Griffith, Incentive Problems in Derivatives 
Trading: Towards a New Corporate Governance Structure for Clearinghouses 24 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author) and Rena S. Miller, Cong. Research Serv., R 41715, 
Conflicts of Interest in Derivatives Clearing 5-6 (Mar. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Cornell University ILR School), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1832&context=key_workplace. 
 93 Representative Barney Frank stated:  
The purpose of this in part is to get many more derivatives cleared. But the 
clearing houses have the right to refuse them if they say the transactions 
aren’t suitable for clearing. We believe that some banks have an interest in 
not having them cleared. So we don’t want entities that have an interest and 
[sic] there being no clearing, owning the clearing houses. That’s why this is 
an important amendment to us, and it was passed after considerable debate 
on the House floor.  
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Dodd-Frank Act plainly aim to increase the volume of OTC 
derivatives transactions cleared on clearinghouse platforms.94 
Influenced by conflicts and self-interested incentives, 
clearinghouse members’ decisions may ironically engender—
rather than reduce—risk. Without formal governance 
safeguards, clearinghouses will not serve as the gatekeepers in 
OTC derivatives markets that Congress and regulators 
envision. While the introduction of clearinghouses alleviates 
some concerns regarding systemic risk in OTC derivatives 
markets, the imposition of clearing requirements without 
sufficient internal governance controls offers an incomplete 
solution. Procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure that 
these conflicts of interest and self-interested incentives do not 
undermine the risk-reducing framework that the Dodd-Frank 
Act introduces. These safeguards should address 
anticompetitive incentives that would disadvantage smaller 
dealers and reduce the volume of transactions subject to 
clearing requirements as well as promote appropriate risk 
management policies to ensure that the clearinghouse remains 
sufficiently liquid and solvent.95  
B. Proposed Rules to Address Clearinghouse Governance 
and Reduce Systemic Risk  
Concerns regarding clearinghouse members’ commercial 
incentives and conflicts of interest have incited a rigorous 
debate among market participants, regulators, and 
commentators.96 Prior to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
legislators did consider adopting statutory language that would 
have ensured balanced participation in clearinghouse 
governance.97 Congressional debate prior to the adoption of the 
final language of the Act reflects commentators’ concerns that 
  
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap 
Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities 
Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 
at 65,887 n.39 (quoting House-Senate Conf. Comm. Holds Markup on HR 4173, 
Financial Regulatory Overhaul Bill, June 24, 2010, reprinted in CQ Congressional 
Transcripts, 111th Cong. 182 (2010) (statement of Barney Frank, Chairman, House 
Comm. on Fin. Servs.)). 
 94 Miller, supra note 92, at 3-4. 
 95 Johnson, Comments, supra note 88, at 48-49. 
 96 Griffith, supra note 92, at 21.  
 97 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-370, at 188-92 (2009).  
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clearinghouse members’ self-interest might undermine 
operational safeguards designed to reduce risk.98  
For example, Representative Stephen Lynch proposed an 
amendment to the working bill in the House of Representatives 
suggesting that the bill include language addressing members’ 
incentives to restrict access to membership.99 The “Lynch 
Amendment” proposed limiting the voting interest of large 
dealers and imposing governance requirements designed to 
ensure that a majority of the members of the clearinghouse 
boards were independent.100 While the Lynch Amendment was 
not incorporated in the legislation,101 the enacted statute does 
include language that empowers federal regulatory agencies to 
adopt rules addressing concerns regarding members’ incentives 
to restrict clearing eligibility and for clearinghouse 
membership.102 Acting pursuant to the express authorization 
extended in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, regulators have 
proposed governance measures that aim to address large 
dealers’ conflicts of interest and their incentives to favor weak 
risk governance policies.103  
In October 2010, the SEC and the CFTC proposed rules 
to address risk governance concerns.104 Employing board 
composition measures similar to the reforms adopted in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that 
enhance the risk-governance policies within publicly traded 
  
 98 See id.  
 99 See id.  
 100 Id.  
 101 Miller, supra note 92, at 6. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-
Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and 
National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under 
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,896 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
 104 Both the CFTC and the SEC proposed rules in October 2010. See 
Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, 
and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 
Fed. Reg. 63,732 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010); Governance Requirements for Derivatives 
Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities; 
Additional Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 722 (Jan. 6, 2011); Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for 
Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, 
and National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under 
Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,895. In March 2011, the federal regulatory agencies 
released statements indicating that they were reopening the ninety-day comment 
period on the proposed rules. As of the date that this article is printed, the regulatory 
agencies have not adopted interim or final rules.  
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companies,105 the proposed rules suggest substantive corporate 
governance reforms.106 The proposals suggest two alternative 
approaches designed to ensure that clearinghouse boards are 
not controlled by a few dominant market participants—voting 
caps and board composition requirements.107  
The SEC describes the first approach as the “Voting 
Interest Focus Alternative.”108 Consistent with its title, the 
Voting Interest Focus Alternative creates individual and 
aggregate ownership limits for specified entities109—a group of 
the larger swap dealers and banks engaging in swap 
transactions. Under the Voting Interest Focus Alternative, a 
specified entity is prohibited from beneficially owning more 
than 20 percent of the voting interests in the clearinghouse.110 
In addition to this limit on each individual clearinghouse 
member’s voting interests, the proposed rule prevents specified 
entities from beneficially owning more than 40 percent of the 
  
 105 For a discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Act reforms, see supra 
notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
 106  See Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities; Additional 
Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. at 722, 
723 nn.8-9 (citing section 726(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 8323(a)); Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract 
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of 
Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,883.  
 107 Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National 
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 65,894-903; Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation 
of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,737-44. 
 108 Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National 
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 65,894. 
 109  Under section 765(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is authorized to 
adopt rules that create numerical limits on the voting control of “Specified Entities,” 
which include bank holding companies with consolidated assets of $50 billion or more, 
a nonbank financial company, an affiliate of a bank holding company or nonbank 
financial company, a security-based swap dealer, or a major security-based swap 
participant. Id. at 65,883. A parallel provision under section 726(a) of the Dodd-Frank 
Act authorizes the CFTC to adopt rules limiting the voting control of Enumerated 
Entities. Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities; Additional 
Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. at 723 
nn.8-9 (citing section 726(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8323(a)). 
 110 Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National 
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 65,894. 
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aggregate voting interests of a clearinghouse.111 The aggregate 
limit “restrict[s] participants’ ability to collectively acquire a 
majority voting interest.”112 Under the second approach—the 
“Governance Focus Alternative”—no clearinghouse member or 
specified entity may own more than 5 percent of the voting 
interests in a clearinghouse.113 The Governance Focus 
Alternative’s smaller limit on voting control is not coupled with 
an aggregate voting limit.114 The voting limitations aim to 
address concerns that large dealers will encourage the adoption 
of anticompetitive membership and clearing eligibility policies. 
To ensure the effectiveness of clearinghouses’ risk 
governance policies, the proposals impose board composition 
and board committee obligations.115 Under the Voting Interest 
Focus Alternative, the proposal limiting individual voting 
interest to 20 percent of the clearinghouse’s voting interests 
and imposing an aggregate voting interest limit of 40 percent 
on specified entities, the clearinghouse must appoint 
independent directors to at least 35 percent of the board 
seats.116 Under the Governance Focus Alternative with the 
smaller 5 percent voting limitation and no aggregate voting 
limit, the proposed rules require the clearinghouse to appoint 
independent directors to a majority of the seats on the board.117 
In addition to these board composition requirements, each 
proposal requires the board of the clearinghouse to establish a 
nominating committee, disciplinary panel, and risk-
management committee.118 The proposed board structural and 
  
 111 Id. at 65,895. 
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. at 65,900. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 65,896, 65,901-02. 
 116 Id. at 65,896. The CFTC proposal requires “public directors,” but defines 
public directors in a manner consistent with the SEC definition of “independent 
director.” See Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated 
Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts 
of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,742 & n.73 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010). 
 117 Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National 
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 65,901. 
 118 Under the SEC’s Voting Interest Focus Alternative, clearinghouses must 
appoint independent directors to at least a majority of the seats on the nominating 
committee. Under the Governance Focus Alternative only independent directors may 
be appointed to the nominating committee. Id. at 65,897, 65,901-02. Under the CFTC 
approval, the chair for the disciplinary panels must be a public director. Requirements 
for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap 
Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
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compositional requirements aim to serve as a critical “check 
against conflicts of interest.”119  
The spirit of these measures exemplifies the type of 
reform that Partnoy endorses in his analysis of the recent 
crisis. Partnoy encourages financial market intermediaries to 
incorporate a “pause” or delay in their deliberative processes.120 
While regulators’ responses to the need for clearinghouse 
governance are laudable, the proposed reforms merely alter the 
composition of the board; the proposed reforms will likely be 
insufficient to address clearinghouse members’ conflicts of 
interest and their incentives to act in manners contrary to 
regulatory goals. Several noteworthy problems undermine the 
presumption that the proposed board composition reforms will 
be sufficient to address the conflicts of interest and incentives 
described above. For example, the limited pool of qualified 
director candidates creates a persistent problem. In order to 
develop, implement and enforce effective risk management 
policies, clearinghouse boards will recruit from a small circle of 
experts and industry insiders. In this insular group, it is 
unlikely that there will be a large pool of truly independent 
candidates that lack material and relational ties to large 
dealers. While there may be candidates who qualify under the 
regulators’ criteria, it is unlikely that candidates with 
appropriate qualifications will not have material ties to the 
dominant financial institutions acting as large dealers—or 
aspirations to develop ties after their prestigious appointments 
to clearinghouse boards.  
Moreover, clearinghouses are self-regulatory organizations. 
Because they function as critical engines in the operation of 
financial markets, clearinghouses serve a unique public-private 
function. The effects of their services impact the broader 
economy. Yet these institutions are either closely held or 
publicly traded businesses that face demands from a diverse 
group of constituents. When members elect directors to serve 
on clearinghouse boards, the members—financial institutions 
  
63,740. The risk management committee requirements in the CFTC proposal offer 
greater details regarding the participation of public directors and include a 
requirement that at least 10 percent of the participants on the risk management 
subcommittee be customer representatives. Id. at 63,741-42.  
 119 Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National 
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 65,896. 
 120 See generally Partnoy, supra note 5.  
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and financial services intermediaries—generally nominate 
their own senior executives as candidates for clearinghouse 
board seats. These elected directors are then presumed to vote 
consistent with the commercial interests of the member 
institution that promoted their candidacy. These directors may 
find it difficult to serve their employers’ commercial interests 
and support policies consistent with the clearinghouse’s quasi-
regulatory role. Significant risk governance concerns arise 
when members’ proprietary interests diverge from the 
regulatory presumption that clearinghouses serve as an 
institutional safeguard against systemic risk or moral hazard.  
C. Improving Clearinghouse Boards’ Decision-Making 
Processes 
Recalling the famous visual awareness experiments by 
Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons, Frank Partnoy 
explains that one of the most significant issues in developing 
effective regulatory reform is identifying the “gorilla” in the 
room.121 Exploring Chabris and Simons’s claim that 
inattentional blindness can challenge even the most diligent 
observer, Partnoy offers several illustrations from the recent 
financial crisis that demonstrate the weaknesses in the 
decision-making processes of several highly sophisticated 
financial institutions.122  
The special position that clearinghouses occupy in financial 
systems justifies regulatory oversight that ensures careful 
development of governance policies. These policies must include 
provisions that address challenges such as members’ incentives to 
adopt anticompetitive membership and clearing eligibility criteria. 
For example, expanding the definition of independence offers one 
approach to encourage a more impartial dialogue in clearinghouse 
boardrooms. In addition, best practice standards and the proposed 
rules suggest that clearinghouse boards should create 
subcommittees focused on addressing risk-management concerns. 
  
 121 See id. at 162.  
 122 See generally id; see also CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE 
INVISIBLE GORILLA: AND OTHER WAYS OUR INSTITUTIONS DECEIVE US 5-6 (2010). 
Chabris and Simons’s experiment illustrates the challenge of perceiving an extremely 
odd event—a gorilla entering the room—when executing a specified task. Id. In 
conducting their experiment, they tasked subjects with counting the number of times 
that team members passed a basketball during a short video. Id. at 5. During the short 
video, a person in a full gorilla suit appears on the video screen. Id. at 6. Half of the 
subjects participating in the experiment did not see the gorilla. Id.  
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Combining these potential solutions, independent directors may 
offer invaluable contributions through their service on risk-
management committees. Such committees would have significant 
autonomy to review and investigate risk-management concerns. 
The risk-management committee or its members must also play a 
significant role in the development of policies that may be within 
the purview of other committees whose decisions have significant 
risk management implications. For example, risk management 
committee members must participate in establishing standards for 
margin and collateral requirements.  
An adaptive and engaging risk-management committee 
will improve the board’s ability to anticipate and address risk-
management issues that threaten the stability of the 
clearinghouse and pose systemic risk concerns. The directors 
appointed to this committee should not only lack material 
financial ties, but they should also have established expertise 
in managing clearinghouse or exchange risk; they should be 
capable of articulating weaknesses in proposed risk-
management policies and evaluating such policies objectively.  
To ensure the benefits of the recently enacted Dodd-
Frank Act, risk-management committees should include a board 
member designated as the contrarian. This board member 
should raise alternative strategies and question the prevailing 
opinion.123 Continuous critical evaluation of risk-management 
policies may lead to revelations about latent weaknesses.124  
CONCLUSION 
Creating procedural safeguards that delay decision-
making processes, or instituting a “pause,” may reduce 
concerns that members’ self-interested incentives will dominate 
clearinghouses’ risk-management decisions. The currently 
proposed voting limitations and board structure and 
composition reforms are likely insufficient to address these 
concerns. Even if the proposed voting limits and corporate-
governance obligations are formally adopted, clearinghouses 
may fail to accomplish the statute’s desired public policy effect. 
To truly impart reform, legislators and regulators must 
  
 123 See Troy A. Parades, Corporate Decisionmaking: Too Much Pay, Too Much 
Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 673, 741-47 (2005) (explaining that recent federal reforms are not a 
substitute for directly addressing psychological biases that motivate managers). 
 124 Id.  
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address the cognitive biases and risk culture concerns that will 
likely permeate clearinghouses’ risk-management policies.  
Federal regulatory agencies must explore alternative 
remedies that address cognitive biases and their influence on 
risk-management decisions. This article suggests imagining 
creative solutions that reach beyond the common regulatory 
responses to traditional corporate governance. Reforms must 
introduce procedural safeguards that ensure that decision 
makers “pause” in their deliberative processes. For most 
boards, incorporating a sufficiently rigorous procedural 
mechanism offers a valuable addition to their decision-making 
process and enhances governance. However, in the context of 
clearinghouse boards, such procedural mechanisms may be 
critical to ensure boards adopt sufficiently rigorous risk 
management policies. The suggested internal procedures create 
a type of “pause” that enables decision makers to better 
manage the risks they face and, consequently, reduce the 
threat of systemic risk and prevent future crises. 
